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Abstract—The popularity and projected growth of in-home
smart speaker assistants, such as Amazon’s Echo, has raised
privacy concerns among consumers and privacy advocates. No-
table questions regarding the collection and storage of user data
by for-profit organizations include: what data is being collected
and how is it being used, who has or can obtain access to such
data, and how can user privacy be maintained while providing
useful services. In addition to concerns regarding what the
speaker manufacturer will do with your data, there are also more
fundamental concerns about the security of these devices, third-
party plugins, and the servers where they store recorded data.
To address these privacy and security concerns, we introduce
a first-of-its-kind intermediary device to provide an additional
layer of security, which we call the smart, smart speaker blocker or
Smart2 for short. By intelligently filtering sensitive conversations,
and completely blocking this information from reaching a smart
speaker’s microphone(s), the Smart2 Speaker Blocker is an open-
source, network-local (offline) smart device that provides users
with decisive control over what data leaves their living room. If
desired, it can completely hide any identifying characteristics by
only allowing the smart speaker to hear a synthesized text-to-
speech voice
I. INTRODUCTION
Market research has shown rampant growth in the adoption
of smart speakers with built-in digital assistants, such as
Amazon’s Alexa or Google’s Home line of products, with
more than 43 million adults in the United States owning a
smart speaker as of spring 2018 [24]. A September 2018
survey estimated 57.8 million Americans own at least one
smart speaker, representing 22% overall domestic growth for
the sector [19]. Market newcomers, such as Facebook’s Alexa-
enabled Portal devices, and the continued expansion of product
portfolios with a lower cost of entry have forecast a worldwide
install base of 100 million by the end of 2018, a number
projected to more than double to 225 million by 2020 [6].
Along with this growth in popularity has come a growing
concern about the privacy implications of these devices. Their
always on nature, coupled with the fact that they stream
the recorded audio to manufacturer-owned servers for voice
recognition means that they potentially give these companies
access to almost everything that goes on in the owners’ homes.
What this data can be used for, who has access to it, and how
long it is stored is often vague, and buried in a lengthy user
agreement that the user consents to when they first use the
device, and is subject to revision at any time. In addition, many
of these devices support extended functionality via plugin
modules written by third party developers, who have their own
data usage and retention agreements. The end result is that who
has access to recorded data and how it is used is often opaque
to the the end user.
Concerns regarding how data is used by legitimate parties
aside, there are also concerns regarding the security of these
devices. Smart speakers are typically low cost devices, and
are produced by dozens of manufacturers. Based on past
experience, it is likely only a matter of time before one or more
of these devices are compromised, with potentially serious
ramifications. For example, one recorded phone conversation
with the user’s bank would provide an attacker with all the
information necessary to access the user’s bank funds. Alter-
nately, a data breach of a large manufacturer’s servers could
leak recorded conversations for millions of users, allowing the
attacker to perform anything from blackmail to identity theft.
In this paper we describe the first proposed solution to
this problem: the smart, smart speaker blocker, or Smart2
for short. The Smart2 works by enclosing the smart speaker’s
built-in microphone in a soundproof enclosure, along with an
external speaker connected to the Smart2 device (see Figure
1). The Smart2 has its own microphone and records audio,
which it filters using speech-to-text, based on user configured
parameters. Audio that does not match the filter rules is played
back for the smart speaker via the external speaker. Several
different filtering modes are implemented, to address a variety
of security concerns, including the ability to completely hide
any identifying characteristics by only allowing the smart
speaker to hear a synthesized text-to-speech voice. The Smart2
is air-gapped (not connected to an external network), making
it difficult for external attackers to compromise, with all
processing done on the local device. All software, including
the speech-to-text library, is open-source and under the end
user’s control, providing complete transparency.
Because this is the first system to protect smart speakers
from accidental data leakage, there are no competing sys-
tems to benchmark against. Instead, our evaluation of the
Smart2 consists of two parts: system performance impact and
a security evaluation. For the system performance impact,
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Fig. 1. The microphone of the smart speaker is insulated from external sounds, and can only hear sounds forwarded by the smart speaker blocker.
we measure the impact of the Smart2 on the smart speaker
performance, particularly the introduction of latency by the
speech-to-text engine, which we demonstrate is minimal. To
evaluate the enhanced security offered by the Smart2, we
perform a two week study of the device’s performance in a
real life environment and show that it substantially reduces
the amount of sensitive audio data leaked, while minimally
impacting the usability of the device.
II. BACKGROUND AND RELATED WORK
The popularity of home voice assistants has caught the
attention of many digital rights organizations and privacy ad-
vocates such as Digitalcourage, the organizing body of the Big
Brother Awards in Germany [3]. The group awarded the 2018
“Consumer Protection” category winner to Amazon Alexa
for Amazon’s practice of storing recorded user interactions
on remote servers [10]. They were also especially critical of
Amazon’s patent for “voice sniffing” algorithms that analyze
background audio for trigger words in order to supply users
with targeted advertising and product recommendations [12].
This functionality is in stark contrast to Amazon’s current
Terms of Use for Alexa, with audio transmission only occur-
ring upon the detection of their device’s wake word [26].
A. Homegrown Bugs
Privacy concerns over which data are actually being
recorded and stored are not unfounded. In addition to the
preeminent concern that stored user interactions (i.e. voice
recordings and text transcripts) do not fall into the wrong
hands, there are cases of extraneous recordings, recordings that
don’t fall under the aforementioned “wake word” behavior,
being sent to external servers. For example, one journalist
testing an early review unit of Google’s Home Mini found
the device recording and transmitting all audio to Google’s
servers around-the-clock. The issue was resolved by per-
manently disabling the device’s touch-sensitive controls just
before its official market release [1]. Other cases have seen
Amazon’s Echo assistant mistaking a word for its wake word,
followed by a misinterpreted “send message” command, which
subsequently sent private conversations to an address book
contact [13].
B. Legislative Uncertainty
Another area of major privacy concern lies in the unknown
legislative capabilities for accessing user data. Data collected
from Internet of Things (IoT) devices are more frequently
surfacing as criminal evidence in court trials. In a 2017 murder
case, data collected from e-mail time stamps, home security
alarm logs, and a Fitbit tracker was used as evidence in
charging the suspect [9]. October 2018 saw the first case in
the United States of a court ordering surveillance footage from
Google’s Nest smart home appliance subsidiary [5]. A trans-
parency report from Nest labs details approximately 300 user
information requests from governments and courts between
June 2015 to June 2018. The report states that search warrants
will first be analyzed to rule out overly broad requests and
ensure the requested data pertains only to the corresponding
warrant before handing over data [23]. The usage of connected
device data in judicial trials has also recently extended to
include smart speakers.
Shortly after Amazon’s Alexa-enabled smart devices ar-
rived on the U.S. market in 2015, an Arkansas court ordered
Amazon to share recordings from a murder suspect’s Echo
speaker. While Amazon initially declined to provide the court
with information, the suspect eventually provided consent to
use the data as evidence [11]. More recently, Amazon has
again been ordered to deliver Echo recordings for use as
incriminating evidence [31]. At the time of this writing, it
remains unknown how Amazon will respond to the court’s
demands.
C. Corporate Transparency
Furthermore, it remains unknown how many general re-
quests from courts and government bodies Amazon receives
for Echo devices in general. This is due to their practice of
listing requests across all brand divisions as a whole when
publishing transparency reports [29]. Google takes the same
approach by not including per-device requests in its trans-
parency reports, however it does include a ratio of the accounts
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received to the number of applicable accounts affected [30]. In
contrast, Apple does not publish any data request information
for its HomePod smart speaker, stating there is no effective
data to release because of its implementation of local dif-
ferential privacy. Instead of associating server-destined user
interactions with a user’s account, differential privacy assign
interactions to a random identifier [2]. Research into Apple’s
implementation of differential privacy in macOS and iOS has
shown a significant lack of transparency in the implementation
among other shortcomings [27].
An additional security vulnerability with the HomePod is
its inability to differentiate between users, meaning anyone
within the vicinity may request potentially sensitive informa-
tion, such as personal notes and audio transcriptions of the
primary user’s text messages [18]. Apple has filed a patent to
implement user profiling but HomePod users, assuming they
are aware of this potential for misuse, must currently choose
between requiring manual authentication on their phone for
every message dictation request, or accepting that anyone with
access to the speaker: house guests, children, etc. can access
their text messages until voice profiling capabilities have been
implemented [14].
How smart speaker manufacturers evaluate external data
requests, how they store user data, how user Terms of Service
are specified and updated, and what information is included
in transparency reports are all entirely dependent upon the
manufacturer and vary between each one. With software
services becoming increasingly interconnected through the
incorporation of third-party applications, e.g. Alexa Skills,
it becomes exponentially difficult for users to maintain an
overview of their personal data. As suggested by Lau et al.,
a legally binding set of industry standards (a` la IEEE) and
certifications that apply to all smart speaker and IoT device
manufacturers is necessary to resolve the existing segmentation
and ambiguity of company policy and legislature [22].
D. Speaker Vulnerability Exploitation
Corporate transparency and legislative reach are not the
only domains for which security must be considered. Hardware
and software vulnerabilities must also be explored as points of
exploitation. Research conducted in 2017 showed the Amazon
Echo’s UART connection port as a point of attack by enabling
access to the device’s firmware, thereby giving root shell
access to its operating system. By installing a persistent shell
script that launches when the device boots and exploiting
Amazon’s audio buffering application tool, raw microphone
data could be streamed to the remote server of an attacker’s
choosing [4]. Although this method of attack required solder-
ing an SD-card reader to the Echo, another research group
proposed using a discrete 3D-printed attachment to mitigate
evidence of tampering [8]. Amazon moved the +3V input
pad to the main board for its second generation of Echo
devices, meaning only 2015-2016 first generation devices are
vulnerable to the “wiretap” attack.
Another form of attack applies to all generations of Alexa
devices and does not require physical access to the device.
This method of attack, known as “skill squatting”, relies
on Amazon’s natural voice recognition algorithms making
misinterpretations when transcribing speech-to-text [20]. For
example, a user wishing to interact with a trusted banking
skill, e.g. “Capital One”, may ask Alexa to “open Capital
One”. Alexa may interpret the user to have said “Capital Won”,
triggering a malicious third-party skill of the same name. The
malicious skill could then be used to obtain information about
the user [33]. Zhang et al. demonstrate a similar form of
attack by means of a malicious skill with the same name as
an authentic skill, but appended with a common phrase or
word, for example, “open Capital One, please” launches the
malicious skill “Capital One Please” instead of the authentic
“Capital One” skill [33].
Kumar et al. noted that Alexa’s speech transcription algo-
rithms are non-deterministic by repeatedly presenting identical
audio files over a reliable network connection and observing
varying outcomes in the speech-to-text results [20]. Limiting
speech samples to the Nationwide Speech Project (NSP)
database, they identified 24 “squattable” words, i.e. semantic
interpretation errors resulting from words that Alexa misin-
terprets both frequently and consistently [20]. The squattable
words were used to identify over 30 susceptible skills available
on the Alexa Skills Store but that number, limited by the
study’s proof-of-concept data set, is only an initial indicator
for potential current and future vulnerable skills. Using skill
squatting, the group was able to successfully demonstrate
phishing attacks and suggests the possibility of using malicious
skills to steal a user’s log-in credentials. By applying gender
and geographic predicates, they also exposed an extension
of the skill squatting attack, “spear skill squatting”, thus
demonstrating the ability to target specific demographics.
With a precedence for political manipulation using targeted
advertisement and the growing smart speaker market, spear
skill squatting has the potential to become a new channel of
social influence [21]. Also noteworthy is the limited set of
best practices currently used on the Alexa Skill Store when
compared to other app store ecosystems, such as allowing
multiple skills to have identical names.
Even though great progress in the development of voice
processing and machine learning algorithms used in personal
voice assistants has been made, as technology progresses,
new possibilities of interacting with AI assistants will emerge,
extending the types of data being exchanged and increasing
the importance of data security. A recently submitted patent
from Amazon details a feature that could determine some
of the physical characteristics or emotional states of a user
and react accordingly. For example, if a user is recognized
as having a sore throat, Alexa might recommend a particular
brand of cough medicine and order it. The patent mentions the
detection of health conditions: having a cold, thyroid issues,
sleepiness and emotional states including happiness, joy, anger,
sorrow, sadness, fear, disgust, boredom, and stress [17]. With
Amazon’s acquisition of online pharmacy PillPack, Inc. in
June 2018, there are inherit benefits to the convenience of
supplying customers with medicine and pharmaceuticals [7].
However, due to the considerable value of medical information,
even when compared to other highly sensitive data such
as credit card and social security information [15], there is
equally an inherit risk in handling such valuable data securely,
responsibly, and transparently.
The segmented set of rules and policies between device
manufacturers, an incomplete set of best practices for third-
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party applications/skills, uncertain legislature, and the future
potential for data harvesting all exhibit the current deficit
surrounding data privacy and smart speakers.
III. THE SMART2 SPEAKER BLOCKER
A. Threat Model
Before discussing the design of Smart2, we first want to
specify the threat model we are attempting to protect against.
Our goal is to protect against sensitive audio data leakage,
either to the device manufacturer or a malicious external third
party. We assume that either the device, the manufacturer’s
server, or both may be compromised or that they, either
intentionally or unintentionally, may not work as advertised.
As such, our goal is to physically prevent audio data we
deem sensitive from ever reaching the microphone of the smart
speaker and entering the unsafe environment. However, once
audio data does reach the smart speaker microphone, Smart2
provides no protection, nor do we provide any protection for
any data stored on manufacturer servers. We also provide no
protection against insider threats who have physical access to
the Smart2 and may easily disable it. Similarly the Smart2 filter
is a tool to enforce a security policy for data leakage specified
by the end user. We provide no protection in the case that the
end user does not specify his personal security policy correctly.
B. Design
The Smart2 is an intermediary that sits between the end
user and the smart speaker, providing user-configured filtering
to prevent sensitive audio from being recorded by the smart
speaker. It does this by enclosing the smart speaker microphone
in soundproof material, along with an external speaker that
is connected to the Smart2. The Smart2 has its own external
microphone that it uses to record environmental audio. This
audio is fed into a speech-to-text engine in chunks, where each
chunk is separated by a pause, indicating a phrase. The speech-
to-text engine converts this phrase to text, and passes it to
the filtering engine. The filtering engine uses a series of user-
specified keywords and actions to decide whether to pass the
phrase along to the smart speaker, drop the phrase, or take other
action. In order to handle different use cases, the Smart2 has
several actions that it can take which are discussed in Section
III-E.
The Smart2 is based on open-source software and non-
proprietary, off-the-shelf hardware. The main hardware com-
ponents consist of a mini-ITX PC running Linux Ubuntu LTS
18.04, an external microphone for speech input, and a speaker
for speech output to the smart speaker. A Python 3 virtual
environment was then created to run Smart2’s speech recog-
nition software, facilitated by the SpeechRecognition Python
library. This library was chosen for its ease of integration and
support of both online and offline speech recognition engines.
To improve security the Smart2 is an air-gapped device,
so we used an offline speech recognition engine developed
by researchers at Carnegie Mellon University to ensure that
interactions with the device remain local. CMU’s CMUSphinx,
an open source, Hidden Markov Model (HMM) based speech
recognition system, was determined to be the most viable
solution due to its offline nature [28].
C. Limitations of the Prototype
Most smart speakers include multiple microphones so that
they can hear incoming audio from any direction, regardless
of how they are placed. Because this is a prototype system,
we did not implement this feature, and instead used a single
omnidirectional microphone and placed it against a wall. Also,
while we recognize that hardware cost and power consumption
are issues for a production system, we focus more on the
system design and usability, and note that while our hardware
is more expensive and consumes more power than a production
system would, the software itself used only a small amount
of memory and processor power and could easily be adapted
to an embedded system. Additionally, for extremely low spec
systems, there is an embedded version of the CMUSphinx
system, called PocketSphinx, that was designed to run on
systems as low end as a 200Mhz ARM processor with 16MB
of memory [16].
D. Offline vs Online Speech Recognition
One concern with an offline system like the Smart2 Speaker
Blocker is the accuracy of the offline speech recognition engine
as compared to an online engine, like those used by smart
speakers themselves. While the CMUSpinx software itself is
not as accurate as, for example, the online Google speech
recognition software, Google has recently developed an offline
speech-to-text system that is as accurate as its online system,
only requires 80MB of memory, can run on low-end mobile
devices, and operates faster-than-realtime on a single core [25].
While this system is currently only available as part of their
GBoard keyboard software and has not been released for public
use, it demonstrates that it is feasible for a low-end device such
as the Smart2 Speaker Blocker to recognize speech as quickly
and accurately as an online system.
E. Operation
The Smart2 can be configured by the user by using
pattern/action pairs. A pattern can simply be a keyword,
such as “password”, or for more sophisticated users it can
include regular expressions. In addition, some actions can take
additional parameters. The current set of actions includes:
• Phrase filter - The phrase filter action drops the
current phrase. This action is intended to be used in
cases where the current phrase may have some sensi-
tive information, but we don’t expect the information
to extend past the current phrase. For example, we
may use the pattern “password” with the phrase filter
action, because we want to filter cases where the user
says things like “My password is XXX”, but we don’t
believe more sensitive information will be discussed
after this phrase.
• Timed filter - The timed filter takes an additional
duration parameter, and does not transmit audio for
a fixed duration after detecting the pattern. This is
intended to filter more sensitive discussions that may
extend beyond the current phrase. For example, the
pattern may be set to “girlfriend” and the duration to
10 minutes, because we do not want sensitive personal
discussions transmitted to the smart speaker, and we
expect that this will be part of a discussion. The
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Fig. 2. Audio data comes in from the microphone and is converted to text by the speech-to-text engine. Text and audio is both passed to the filtering engine,
which decides whether or not to play the audio back for the smart speaker.
duration of this filter may be extended if other timed
filter patterns are detected, and the duration is the time
to wait after the last occurrence of the pattern.
• Pattern deletion filter - The pattern deletion filter
deletes the pattern from the phrase, and transmits it to
the smart speaker. It does this by removing the pattern
from the phrase text, and using a text-to-speech engine
to play back the modified text.
In addition to pattern matching, the Smart2 has several
other modes that are activated by keywords or other triggers.
These are:
• Privacy mode - This mode is activated by keyword,
and does not transmit any data to the smart speaker
until it is turned off. While this mode replicates the
physical “Mute” button on most smart speakers, for
many smart speakers it is not clear if the mute button is
a hardware mute button, meaning no electrical signals
are sent from the microphone to the device, or a
software mute, meaning the software ignores the input
from the microphone. In many cases it is strongly
suspected that the button is a software button, in
which case the software may intentionally or through
programming errors continue to transmit. Software
mute buttons are also vulnerable to exploits which can
render them inoperable. Privacy mode guarantees (to
the extent that Smart2 is bug-free) that sound cannot
be recorded by the smart speaker.
• Strict hotword mode - In this mode only audio that is
prefixed by the hotword for the smart speaker is passed
through. All other audio is blocked. This completely
prevents the smart speaker from inadvertently listening
to any conversation that is not a specific command.
• Loudness mode - Loudness mode uses a decibel
estimator to estimate the loudness of the speaker’s
voice. This mode is an example of a more general
emotion detection filter, where the user can filter based
on their current mood. Loudness mode is designed to
detect arguments or disagreements, which the user is
unlikely to want transmitted to the smart speaker. This
mode was inspired by a recent Amazon patent which
detects the mood of smart speaker users [17].
• Text-to-speech mode - This mode is activated by
keyword, and uses text-to-speech to mask the identity,
gender, or other identifying features of the speaker,
providing an extra layer of anonymity.
F. Configuration
The Smart2 speaker filter is completely configurable by
the user. In the current prototype the set of filters to be used,
keywords, wait times, and other parameters for the filters are
stored in a plain text format. In a production system this would
be replaced by a simple graphical interface for ease-of-use. To
aid novice users, a default policy configuration consisting of
common sensitive phrases could be included that the user could
customize.
IV. PERFORMANCE EVALUATION
In our analysis of the Smart2 system we consider three
aspects of the system. The first aspect is system performance
impact, meaning the impact of the Smart2 system on the
performance of the smart speaker from a latency perspective.
The second part attempts to address the increased security
offered by the Smart2. To measure this, we measure the amount
of sensitive information that is blocked by the Smart2 Speaker
Blocker. The third part of our evaluation is to consider the
usability of the system, both with respect to the ease of
configuration and the impact on the usability of the smart
speaker itself.
A. System Performance Impact
To evaluate the impact of the Smart2 on smart speaker
performance, we consider the latency introduced to the smart
speaker responses due to the Smart2 and the increases in the
smart speaker error rate both in general and when used with
the additional speech-to-text layer.
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Fig. 3. Our test setup consists of the Smart2 along with a separate networked computer which records both the raw audio and the output from the Smart2.
Both sets of audio recordings were transcribed using the online Google speech-to-text API, and compared.
1) Experimental Setup: The hardware used for our tests
consists of a mini-ITX PC with an i7 7500u 15W mobile
CPU, 8GB of memory, and a 128GB SSD drive running Linux
Ubuntu LTS 18.04, an external microphone for speech input,
and a speaker for speech output to the smart speaker. The
system was developed in Python 3, using the SpeechRecogni-
tion package and the CMUSphinx library with the CMUDict
dictionary for US English for speech recognition. Text-to-
speech was done using the PyTTSX3 library, an offline library.
The smart speaker used was the Amazon Echo Dot, Generation
2.
2) Latency: The Smart2 system by necessity introduces
some latency into smart speaker interactions, simply because it
must play back audio. This is somewhat mitigated by the fact
that most smart speaker commands are generally quite short,
for example querying about the weather or time. In addition
to the playback time, additional latency is introduced by the
speech-to-text (STT) engine and for some modes, the text-to-
speech (TTS) engine. Because the playback time is fixed, and
always equal to the length of the phrase spoken, we focus
our measurements on the processing overhead introduced.
Additionally, while there are many filters available, they all
utilize the speech-to-text engine in the same way, so we present
one set of results rather than one set per filter. The one
exception to this is the filters which utilize text-to-speech,
however in our tests we found that the computation time
required for text-to-speech was negligible.
We evaluated Smart2’s processing overhead by running a
controlled experiment using four separate speech recordings
as input data for the system. Each test was timed using the
system’s current time at the end of the capture audio procedure.
Each test was repeated ten times and the results averaged. The
tests were conducted by the system as follows:
1) Initialize microphone for audio input
2) Capture ambient background noise and adjust the
microphone accordingly (SpeechRecognition)
3) Play recording
4) Capture audio data
5) Retrieve system time
6) Transcribe speech to text (CMUSphinx)
7) Evaluate text transcript via the filter engine
8) Write elapsed time, evaluation results, and transcrip-
tion to file output
TABLE I. PROCESSING TIME (MS)
Input Action Min Max Avg (/10)
“How’s the weather today?” FWD 205 227 210
“Bank account password.” BLOCK 197 228 205
“What’s 10 x 3?” FWD 186 201 192
“Play Pachelbel Canon in D.” FWD 218 240 226
The process was repeated ten times for each recording.
Performance testing results are documented in Table I, showing
the minimum, maximum, and average processing time in
milliseconds. Testing the system indicated the Smart2 adds
approximately 200 milliseconds of overhead to convert speech
to text and apply the filtering rules. The vast majority of this
time is used by the speech-to-text library, with the filtering
process taking an almost undetectable amount of time due to
the efficiency of the Python regex library and the small text
size. We additionally repeated these tests including the time
to convert the output text to audio using the text-to-speech
library, but found that the additional overhead introduced by
this step was negligible.
3) Accuracy: The error rate of the speech-to-text library
is determined by the size of the dictionary, the complexity of
the model, and various other parameters. The Sphinx4 library
has reported error rates as low as 3.9%, for small dictionary
sizes[28]. In comparison, server-based speech-to-text services,
like those used by smart speakers, typically achieve around
5% error rates for general speech[32].
To test the accuracy of the Spinx4 library used in our
system, we recorded a series of phrases and conversations.
We then chose three environments to test:
• An empty, quiet room
• A room with a television on in the background
• A room with a recording of four people holding a
conversation playing in the background
We played back our pre-recorded phrases and conversations
in each environment and transcribed them using both Google
online text-to-speech (default model) and the Sphinx4 library,
then compared the transcripts with a hand transcription. We
repeated this ten times and averaged the results. The error rates
for the Google online engine in our test were 4.1%, 4.1%, and
6.4%, respectively. For Sphinx4 the error rates were 5.6%,
7.2%, and 7.5%.
6
While the Sphinx4 engine had higher error rates than the
Google online engine, the results were reasonable. Anecdo-
tally, errors were typically in more complex words, proper
nouns, and homophones. The Sphinx4 engine is much older
than the Google engine, so these results were expected. How-
ever, as we mentioned in section 3.4, offline engines can
perform as well as online engines.
B. Experimental Review and Participant Selection
Because our experiments in the next section involved
human subjects, our experimental design was reviewed and
approved by our University Research Ethics Subcommittee.
Some concerns were raised regarding our storage of personal
data, particularly recordings or transcripts of conversations.
Because of this, we verified that no audio recordings or
transcripts were stored in any of our experiments. We store
only counts of policy violations, rather than transcripts of the
conversations. Because the configuration files themselves may
contain sensitive information, these files were deleted by the
participants prior to returning the devices.
Participants in our experiments were volunteers recruited
from the University via an e-mail advertisement. All had
prior experience using smart speakers. Participants were given
an introduction to how the Smart2 functioned and told that
it would be constantly listening to their conversations, but
would not be recording or transcribing them. They were also
trained in how to configure the various filter options and given
a manual and example configuration. As compensation for
participation, volunteers were given a new Amazon Echo Dot.
C. Security and Usability Assessment
To assess security and usability we setup the Smart2 in a
test configuration in ten home environments with a total of 25
users where the home owners regularly use a smart speaker.
We assisted the home owners in setting up and configuring
the Smart2 for use with an Amazon Echo Dot that we also
supplied. The Smart2 Speaker was used in each home for
two weeks. At the end of the test, the device was collected
and all family members were given a survey regarding their
experiences with the device.
Our test configuration, shown in Figure 3, consisted of
the Smart2 and a separate computer with two microphones.
One microphone was used to record output from the Smart2
and the other to record the raw, unfiltered audio. Both the
raw audio and filtered audio were recorded and transcribed
using the online Google speech-to-text API, which we used as
our ground truth. We then compared both transcripts with the
keyword list from the Smart2 device configuration to determine
how many instances of privacy sensitive words were in the
original audio vs the filtered audio. Averaged across the entire
test group, we found that the Smart2 filtered 97.6% of privacy
sensitive words, a significant improvement over the unfiltered
audio.
To asses the usability of the device, we gave all 25 users a
short six question Likert scale-based survey at the end of the
experiment. The questions included:
1) Did your smart speaker seem noticeably slower than
usual? (1 - not at all to 5 - much slower)
2) Does the Smart2 make you more comfortable talking
near your smart speaker? (1 - not at all to 5 - much
more comfortable)
3) Do you feel the Smart2 made your smart speaker
unusable? (1 - completely unusable to 5 - about the
same)
4) Was the Smart2 easy to configure? (1 - very difficult
to 5 - very easy)
5) Do you feel the Smart2 makes you safer? (1 - not
safer at all to 5 - much safer)
6) What is your opinion of the Smart2? (1 - very
unfavorable to 5 very favorable)
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Fig. 4. Average ratings for Likert-based post-experiment survey.
As can be seen in figure 4 most users noticed a small
decrease in the speed of the smart speaker when used with the
Smart2, but did not feel it made the smart speaker unusable.
Users also overwhelmingly felt that the Smart2 was easy to
configure and improved the security of their smart speaker.
Correspondingly, the overall opinion of the Smart2 was very
favorable.
V. DISCUSSION AND FUTURE WORK
Smart speakers pose an enormous potential privacy risk
to consumers, a risk that they currently have little way to
mitigate. In this paper we present the Smart2 system, which
leverages the same machine learning algorithms that endanger
user privacy to offer transparent, open-source protection for
users of smart speakers that is completely under their control.
We then demonstrate that the device offers significant privacy
enhancement, filtering 97.6% of sensitive audio in our test,
while at the same time minimally impacting the performance
of the smart speaker.
While the Smart2 is a complete system as presented, we
feel there is substantial work remaining to be done. The most
substantial improvement would be to replace the older Sphinx4
engine with the newly developed Google offline speech-to-text
engine, which would increase accuracy and decrease latency
to near zero. Other improvements would be implementing
emotion detection based filtering and other filtering modes that
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are not strictly keyword based. We also feel that approach
of using machine learning to develop systems that protect or
enhance the security of end user systems and devices is a
promising technique that has not been broadly explored either
commercially or in the research literature.
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